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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 16-3722 
________________ 
 
COLLEEN REILLY; BECKY BITER; 
ROSALIE GROSS 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF HARRISBURG; HARRISBURG CITY COUNSEL; 
MAYOR ERIC PAPENFUSE, In his Official capacity as 
Mayor of Harrisburg 
 
   Collen Reilly; Becky Biter,  
    Appellants 
     ________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-16-cv-00510) 
District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
________________ 
 
Argued March 21, 2017 
________________ 
 
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed May 25, 2017) 
 
ORDER  AMENDING  PRECEDENTIAL  OPINION 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 IT IS NOW ORDERED that the Precedential Opinion in the above case filed May 
25, 2017, be amended as follows:   
 
 On page 12, Section B, second paragraph, line two, replace “bear” with “have” 
 
 On page 12, Section B, second paragraph, lines four and eight, replace 
“Government” with “[g]overnment”. 
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 On page 12, Section B, second paragraph, line thirteen, replace “Government’ 
with “government”. 
 
 On page 13, at the end of line 2 after “burden of Plantiffs.”, insert a footnote that 
reads as follows:  “To be clear, we do not take Ashcroft or Gonzales to stand for the 
proposition that the government has the burden of proving that a preliminary injunction is 
not an appropriate remedy.  To the contrary, the moving party still retains the burden of 
proof in two principal ways: it must prove that the law restricts protected speech and that 
it will suffer irreparable harm.  See Goodman v. Illinois Dep’t of Fin. & Prof’l 
Regulation, 430 F.3d 432, 438 (7th Cir. 2005) (as to the first burden, rejecting a motion 
for a preliminary injunction because the moving party failed to “show that protected 
speech is being restricted”).  If the moving party meets the first burden, then the 
government must justify its restriction on speech under whatever level of scrutiny is 
appropriate (intermediate or strict) given the restriction in question.  See Thalheimer v. 
City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[I]n the First Amendment 
context, the moving party bears the initial burden of making a colorable claim that its 
First Amendment rights have been infringed, or are threatened with infringement, at 
which point the burden shifts to the government to justify the restriction.”);  cf. Byrum v. 
Landreth, 566 F.3d 442, 446 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[W]hen considering the likelihood of 
success, the district court should have inquired whether there is a sufficient likelihood the 
State will ultimately fail to prove its regulation constitutional.”)  Despite the suggestion 
of Defendants to the contrary, they have the burden even under intermediate scrutiny 
because, as already noted, “the burdens at the preliminary injunction stage track the 
burdens at trial.”  Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 429; cf. Casey v. City of Newport, R.I., 308 F.3d 
106, 111 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that, in the application of intermediate scrutiny, “[t]he 
burden of proof is on the City to demonstrate that its restrictions on speech are narrowly 
tailored”); Byrum, 566 F.3d at 446 (in the context of commercial speech, which is also 
subject to intermediate scrutiny).  If the government succeeds in justifying the restriction, 
then the motion for a preliminary injunction fails because there is no likelihood of 
success on the merits.  And even if the moving party prevails on that prong, it still bears 
the burden of showing irreparable injury.  That brings us back to the balancing of the 
factors that we have addressed earlier in this opinion.” 
 
 On page 13, in the first full paragraph, line 10, replace the word “bear” with 
“meet”. 
 
 On page 13, in the first full paragraph, line 11, after “ordinance is narrowly 
tailored” insert “appropriate to the government interest involved.”   
 
By the Court, 
       /s/ Thomas L. Ambro, Circuit Judge 
Dated: June 26, 2017                                             
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